Abstract
Introduction
That business ethics is a truly interdisciplinary field o f study, is evident from an analysis o f the contributors to the academic journals on Business and Professional Ethics. It is equally evident that contributors from various disciplines tend to approach this interdisciplinary field o f study differently. Jones (1982:211) for example, m ade a broad typology o f the differences between the concerns o f the various disciplines which contribute to the field o f business ethics. He contended that theologians seems to be more interested in macro-economic ethical issues about the moral legitimacy o f economic systems. The academic discipline o f business management seems to be more focused on the meso-economic issues about the interaction between business and society. Philosophers, according to this typology, tend to engage themselves more with issues on the micro-economic level about the morality o f specific business actions. Participation in the field o f business ethics has fortunately not been restricted to these three role players. Recently contributions by psychologists have becom e more prominent. The issues about moral decision-making raised by psychologists through their contributions within the field o f business and professional ethics will be explored from a philosophical perspective in this article.
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Business ethics and moral decision-making
When philosophers approach the field o f business ethics, their contributions tend to be in the form o f applied ethics. In this form it applies moral theory to practical issues in business. A glimpse at textbooks on business ethics written by philosophers testifies to this fact (cf. Olen & Barry 1996; Velasquez 1992; Beauchamp & Bowie 1993; Boatright 1993; W hite 1993) . In most cases one finds that textbooks start by explaining the content o f classical moral theories. Thereafter these theories are applied -often by means o f a series o f contemporary readings -to topical issues in contem porary business. The assumption behind this approach clearly is that moral theories can assist one in making decisions about difficult moral issues in business. W hat most textbooks, however, fail to do, is to show how one should move from com peting -and often irreconcilable -moral theories to moral solutions. W hat is thus evidently lacking is the process o f decision-making that should bridge the gap between moral theory and practical moral solutions.
Recently this flaw in the philosophical approach to business ethics has been exposed by psychologists working in the field o f business or professional ethics (cf. Gawthrop & Uhlemann 1992; K avathatzopoulos 1993; Kavathatzopoulos 1994) . They have argued that moral theories on their own are inadequate for making moral decisions. W hat is needed for moral decision-making is a specific strategy that can produce practical solutions to moral problems. They have further dem onstrated that training in moral decision-making strategy is effective to secure a transition from heteronomous to autonomous moral decision-making. In this respect they have enriched the study o f business ethics by securing greater attention for the process o f moral decision-making. Their contribution should thus be regarded as a valuable contribution to the ongoing discourse about business ethics.
Contributions to discourses always tend to evoke further contributions. This article is intended to be a response from a philosophical angle to this specific contribution that was made. The response will have two dimensions. On the one hand the suspicion that the mentioned psychologists seem to harbour against the value o f moral theories for moral decision-making will be supported from a philosophical perspective. On the other hand, an aspect o f moral decision making that seems to be neglected in the mentioned contributions will be attended to. That aspect is the thinking skills needed for applying any moral decision making strategy.
Moral theory and moral decisions
It has already been stated that philosophical textbooks 011 business ethics seem to suggest that moral theories are a good point o f departure for making moral decisions. This assumption, however, needs further examination.
Ethical theories are theories about the justification o f moral actions. They propose appropriate reasons on which moral decisions should be based. Traditionally two major kinds o f moral theories are distinguished, viz. deontological and consequensialist theories. Recently more theories w ere added, such as virtue theories and narrative theories. When ethical theories are com pared, it is evident that there is no consensus on w hat these alleged appropriate reasons are that should ground our moral decisions (M acIntyre, 1981:5) .
Kant, as the classical representative o f deontological theories, contends that we should dutifully obey the imperatives for moral behaviour that is evident to all rational persons. Mill, representing a specific strand o f consequentialism, argues that the amount o f collective happiness rendered by actions should be the basis for our moral decisions. N arrative theories, again assert that the symbolic universe in which our lives are situated should determine what course o f action we should follow in our moral decision-making. And so we can continue listing the alleged appropriate reasons which should gird our moral decisions.
Com paring just the three mentioned theories, it is evident that each o f them opted for a different criterium for morality. Though none o f these criteria are uncontroversial, each o f them can be rationally justified. In that sense none o f them can be dism issed as nonsensical, but at the same time none o f them can claim superiority. Far from pointing out the one and only way tow ard moral decision making, they rather formulate the various reasons that were historically advanced to ground moral decisions. There is no neutral referee available to decide which moral theory is best. It is exactly for this reason that the contemporary culture is described as a culture o f moral dissensus.
This phenomenon o f moral dissensus does not imply that moral theories should be dism issed as meaningless and in a state o f mess. Moral theories still have value. They can help moral agents understand themselves better, in the sense that they provide detailed rational explanations for convictions that many people are only able to express as gut-feelings. Knowledge o f moral theories can also sensitise one for the strengths and w eaknesses o f particular moral theories. They can assist one in becoming more tolerant towards persons who differ from you, because one will realise that within our culture o f moral dissensus the moral theory that one subscribes to does not enjoy a monopoly status.
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Although moral theories are useful for moral aw areness and for understanding moral discourse, their usefulness in real decision-making about moral issues in business is restricted by various factors, o f which two will be mentioned here:
• Moral dissensus is not only typical o f post-m odern culture in general, but also o f business and more specifically large corporations. This moral dissensus has important implications for moral decision-making on disputes in which more than one person or party is involved. If w e assume for the moment that people do indeed use moral theories as the basis for their moral decisions, then the question inevitably arises what should be done w hen persons who adhere to different moral theories propose conflicting solutions for the dispute. M oral theories themselves cannot lead us out o f this impasse, because it has already been stated that it is impossible to judge one moral theory superior to another, because they are all in principle rationally and morally valid. Something more than moral theory is needed to solve this dilemma. W hat is needed is a strategy for moral decision-making and the thinking skills required by that strategy. This will be discussed later in this article.
• A further restriction o f moral theories has to do with their nature. A moral theory proposes an abstract and clearly defined rule or principle that should guide all our actions. The situations that require moral judgem ent do not display the same features. On the contrary, situations in which w e need to make moral decisions are concrete, clouded and controversial. They simply do not permit moral theories to be applied easily and neatly (cf. Vermaak, 1995:160) . Solving moral dilemmas often dem ands difficult com prom ises and a creative mixture o f various moral considerations. M oral theories once again might prove to be m ost helpful in understanding and analysing moral dilemmas, but they cannot produce solutions to moral problems. M ore than ju st moral theories are needed to produce practical solutions to moral problems.
It is to that "more" that the rest o f this article will attend.
Strategy for moral decision-making
It has been argued till now that more than moral theory is needed for making moral decisions when faced with moral dilemmas. Psychologists indicated that the "more" that is needed is "problem solving ability" (cf. Kavathatzopoulos 1994:379). W hat will be explored next, is what "problem solving ability" entails as seen from a philosophical perspective. Such a perspective can enrich the mentioned psychological contributions to business ethics that seem to be merely concerned with facilitating a shift from what Piaget (1932) term ed a heteronomous to an autonomous method o f problem solving. W hat seem s to be neglected is the quality o f the decision-making process and the skills needed for making high quality decisions. Philosophy, through its tradition o f inquiry first in logic, later in informal logic and most recently in the critical thinking movement (cf. Van Veuren, 1995) can offer perspectives that can contribute towards our understanding o f and com petency in "problem solving ability" .
Problem solving in any domain always involves two things: strategy and execution. Strategy can be described as the plan according to which the problem at hand will be solved. Execution again, refers to performing the various steps or cognitive operations that the strategy demands for reaching a solution. In this section the focus will be on strategy and in the next section on the execution o f the strategy.
A strategy for moral problem solving should o f course take the limitations o f moral theories discussed above, as well as the fact o f moral dissensus, into consideration. W hat is thus needed is a strategy for moral decision-making that does not rely too heavily on moral theories and that also give due credit to the fact o f moral dissensus.
A proposal for a strategy that meets these demands is the RIM S strategy for group decision-making that was previously published in Koers (cf. Rossouw, 1993:283-298 ; also see Rossouw 1994:53-71) . RIM S is an acronym for Rational Interaction fo r M oral Sensitivity. The rationale behind this strategy will not be explained fully here, because it has already been done at length in the publications just referred to. The basic assumptions underlying the RIMS strategy will merely be mentioned briefly. They are the following:
• Firstly, it assum es that m oral dissensus is an inescapable fe a tu re o f our current culture. M odernity, in its attempt to find a secular and rational ground for morality, produced various secular and rational grounds for morality. All o f these grounds are rationally justifiable and defensible. This resulted in the current situation o f dissensus, where none o f the competing moral theories can succeed in gaining superiority over the others. They therefore need to be taken either equally seriously, or all o f them need to be rejected. The first option forms the first assumption o f the RIMS strategy.
• Secondly, it assumes that m oral dissensus does not neccesarily result in ethical relativism. M oral dissensus only equals ethical relativism, if it is assum ed that discourse between the rival moral viewpoints has become meaningless. This is not the case in the RIM S strategy. It rests on the assumption that interaction between rival moral viewpoints is not only neccesary, but is also an important source o f creativity that can assist all involved in finding moral decisions that are more morally sensitive.
• Thirdly, it assumes that through dialogue conflicting m oral views can be creatively harnessed to produce morally sensitive solutions to moral dilemmas. The preconditions for such a dialogue are that the reality o f moral dissensus is understood and accepted by all participants in the RIM S strategy, and that participants commit themselves to finding a solution amidst the moral dissensus. Once this has occurred, the rivalry between moral viewpoints no longer frustrates moral decion-making, but becomes a creative resource that offers the opportunity o f finding more com prehensive and morally sensitive solutions to the problem under discussion than any o f the rival moral viewpoints can achieve on its own.
• Once this is granted and moral dissensus is accepted as a reality in current culture, it follows that a mere focus on underlying motives cannot solve moral problems amidst moral dissensus. At most a focus on moral motives can illuminate the various moral view points, but it cannot overcome the rivalry between conflicting moral viewpoints. For this reason the RIM S strategy advises that motivations underlying moral views should not becom e the main focus point o f the dialogue between participants. The focus should rather be on finding solutions that can accom m odate the concerns o f all involved.
• Fifthly, it assumes that proper m oral decisions can only be taken on the basis o f balanced a nd reliable information. This information is provided by generating all the moral arguments which participants can identify on the issue under discussion. Before such arguments are accepted into the dialogue, participants should ensure that everyone involved in the dialogue understands the argument and that there is no factually false information included in the argument. This o f course does not mean that all participants should agree with an argument before it can be included in the dialogue. It only implies that the arguments identified should be recognised as clear moral arguments.
This decision-making strategy can be broken down into three steps. They are:
Step 1: G enerate and audit argum ents Any moral argument that satisfies the following three criteria should be taken into consideration in the decision-making process:
-The argument should not only take the interests o f the person or party presenting it, into consideration, but should also consider the interests o f other persons affected by the issue under discussion.
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-The argument should be factually correct and logically coherent.
Step 2: Identify consequences
Persons involved in the decision-making process should avoid as far as possible focusing on one another's motives or moral presuppositions and should rather focus on the positive and negative implications identified by the various arguments.
Step 3:
Find solutions
Participants should co-operate in finding solutions that will restrict these identified negative implications to a minimum, while retaining as far as possible the positive concerns identified in the previous step. (For an illustration o f how the RIM S strategy can be applied to the moral disputes on affirmative action and com pulsory AIDS testing respectively, see Rossouw, 1994:72-92 and 93-110 .)
The mere application o f a problem-solving strategy, such as the RIM S strategy, to a moral dispute does not guarantee that the said strategy will be properly executed. In order to apply a strategy such as the RIM S one properly, certain cognitive com petence is needed -in other words, one needs the appropriate thinking skills that is implied by the strategy. It is exactly this element, viz. the teaching o f thinking skills that is needed for applying a strategy for problem solving properly, that seems to be neglected in the specific psychological contributions on problem solving referred to at the beginning o f this article.
In the rest o f the article an indication will be given o f the kind o f thinking skills needed for proper problem solving. The RIM S strategy will again be used to illustrate w hat thinking skills are required by such a problem solving strategy. O ther moral problem solving strategies will o f course require other thinking skills, but my contention is that no strategy can be executed properly unless persons using those strategies have acquired the thinking skills required by the specific strategy they are using. Some remarks about the teaching o f these skills will also be ofiered.
Thinking skills for moral decision-making
The thinking skills that are required to execute each o f the three steps o f the RIM S strategy properly are the following:
Step 1:
• Argum entation skills: In order to provide the information on which the ultimate decision will be based, the various arguments for and against the issue under dispute should be identified. This implies that one should know what an argument is and have the ability to formulate arguments. One should also be able to identify implied arguments as well as assumptions that have not been spelled out explicitly in some arguments.
• Identification o f m oral arguments: M oral decisions can only be based on moral arguments. It is therefore important that participants should also be able to distinguish moral arguments from amoral and immoral arguments. They should also be able to identify ego-centric and socio-centric arguments.
• C larity and coherence: Information is only useful when it is clear and intelligible. This implies that arguments should be stated clearly. Key concepts in arguments should be well defined in order to eliminate vagueness and ambiguity. Arguments should also be formulated in a logically coherent way in order to make them clear and understandable to all involved.
• Intellectual tolerance: In order to give all arguments that meet the three criteria spelled out in step one o f the RIM S strategy due consideration, participants also need intellectual tolerance. If they lack this virtue they will prematurely dismiss arguments that they do not agree with. (Strictly speaking intellectual tolerance is a trait o f mind (virtue) rather than a thinking skill, but for the purposes o f this paper a broad notion o f thinking skills will be used that include virtues as well.)
Step 2:
• Distinguish m otives fro m arguments: The RIM S strategy dem ands that motives should be avoided as far as possible. In order to avoid dwelling on motives, participants should o f course be able to separate an argument from the motives underlying the argument. Participants should also be able to exercise meta-cognitive control in order to avoid straying into motives.
• Identify implications: The RIM S strategy further dem ands that the focus should be on the implications or concerns identified through the various arguments. The skill that is needed here, is the ability to identify the consequences or concerns o f each o f the arguments presented in the dialogue. When the implication(s) o f an argument is not spelled out explicitly participants should also have the ability to formulate implied implications. Furthermore participants should also have the ability to distinguish positive concerns from negative ones.
• M aking compromises: Participants need to find a way out o f the impasse created by conflicting viewpoints presented by moral arguments for and against the issue under discussion. In order to do that they need the ability to find positions that will minimise the negative consequences/concerns identified, while at the same time retaining the positive consequences/concerns that have been identified.
• Creative thinking skills: The fact that there is a moral dispute, suggests that existing approaches or proposals are not effective in solving the dispute. There is thus a need for finding new ways o f dealing with the issue at hand. This implies a need for creative thinking skills. Various techniques to stimulate innovation can be utilised in this regard, such as brainstorming, opposites, visualisation, and forced association to name but a few.
Each o f these skills can and should be taught. If only decision-making strategy is taught, participants in the decision-making process will only learn how to make decisions and not how to make them properly. Teaching them the thinking skills that a specific strategy demands, enables them to make their moral decisions properly. This is not only true for the RIMS strategy but for all other decision making strategies. Each strategy demands specific thinking skills in order to apply the strategy properly and thus to render a high quality result.
The teaching o f thinking skills is a many faceted endeavour in w hich not only thinking skills should be addressed, but also matters such as the motivation to develop thinking skills, the virtues demanded for independent and innovative thinking, and factors that enable or disable one's ability to think properly (cf. R ossouw & Lamprecht, 1995) . It is impossible to cover these m atters in this paper. Fortunately an abundance o f literature available on these matters exists (like Paul, 1993 , Collins & Mangieri, 1992 . Just as the field o f business ethics offers opportunities for participation to many disciplines, so does the teaching of thinking skills for moral decision-making as well.
Conclusion
In reaction to contributions made by specific psychologists to the field o f business ethics, and more specifically to moral decision-making in business ethics, two main arguments w ere raised in this article. Firstly, their claim that moral decision-making requires more than moral theories, was supported from a philosophical angle. Secondly, a certain dimension, essential to the execution o f any moral decision-making strategy that seems to be neglected in the mentioned contributions, have been identified: the thinking skills which are required for the proper execution o f a moral decision-making strategy. It was then illustrated what those thinking skills entail by using the RIM S strategy for moral decision making as an example.
Although not an explicit objective o f this article, it is also hoped that the article contibuted tow ards an understanding and appreciation o f the importance and need o f interdisciplinary work in the field o f business ethics.
